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CONSTITUION AND NARRATIVE IN THE AGE OF 
CRISIS IN JAPANESE POLITICS  
Keigo Komamura∗ 
 
 Abstract:  The most significant political issue facing the legal world in Japan is 
the drive for constitutional revision led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP). This paper situates the revisionist movement within the context of 
postwar Japanese politics before drawing on theoretical literature in critical legal studies to 
analyze the LDP’s draft constituion to reveal the magnitude of the proposed changes and to 
assess the risk they pose to the rule of law in Japan. The paper argues that the proposed draft 
constitution eschews the languages of the current constitution like “a universal principle of 
mankind”,  “individual”,  or “ fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free”, and forgoes 
the basic legal rationality in favor of a mythical narrative of national essence, thereby  
reducing law to the realm of politics and inhibiting the ability of the former to serve as a check 
against the latter. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
      Mr. Shinzo Abe, current Prime Minister of Japan, arguably 
achieved a political victory by passing contentious national security bills 
in September 2015.  This development looks like a historic turn for 
constitutional politics in postwar Japan.  From a practical point of view, 
this apparent victory may be no more than an illusion.  However, from a 
legal and moral point of view, this change of direction may be seen as a 
dangerous turn for constitutionalism.  
With the new national security laws, the government expands its 
military role, and in particular, asserts the right to collective 
self-defense—something that consecutive cabinets have prohibited over 
four decades based on a long-standing interpretation of Article 9 of the 
Constitution of Japan.1  PM Abe has changed the basic constitutional 
                                                   
∗ Vice President, Keio University, Tokyo; Professor of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, Keio 
University, Tokyo.  I thank Mr. Adam Lyons, Ph.D. candidate, Harvard University, for his comments 
on earlier drafts and for proofreading.  Any faults in this essay are entirely my own. 
1  The government has further expressed its official opinion to explain its interpretation about 
the relationship between self-defense measures and the Constitution of Japan.  They often referred to 
the right to individual self-defense, which article 9 of the Constitution allowed Japan to hold and use 
under their interpretation.  As for the right to collective self-defense, the Cabinet clarified its position 
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arrangement not by changing the text of Article 9 of the Constitution of 
Japan (1946), but rather by changing his cabinet’s interpretation of the 
text.  
Many (actually almost all) constitutional law scholars in Japan see 
this change of interpretation and the subsequent national security bills as 
unconstitutional.2  Not just legal scholars, but also many professionals 
including former judges of the Supreme Court of Japan, former directors 
of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, political and social scientists, and 
members of the opposition parties, and also a substantial number of 
students and the youth—a considerable percentage of the 
population—have cast doubts on PM Abe’s approach to constitutional 
change.3  In Japan today we can hear critical voices from many sectors.   
To overcome the people’s doubts and criticisms, PM Abe might 
well have attempted to formally revise the Constitution by reforming the 
text itself.  This option might have been a royal road for PM Abe.  
Formal constitutional reform might have swept away certain doubts and 
criticisms of the reinterpretation tactic that has been perceived as 
underhanded.  There may even have been a public benefit if PM Abe 
and his administration had attempted to formally revise article 9 through 
constitutional change.  I mean to say that the proposal for a formal 
revision of the Constitution would lead to public awareness of the 
fundamental nature of the proposed change.  
It is generally said that throughout most of postwar period the 
Japanese People have been keeping themselves distant from realistic 
                                                                                                                                                 
in 1972: Japan has collective self-defense right under international law, but cannot use it due to 
constitutional restriction. See Government’s written answer submitted to the Audit Committee of the 
House of Councilors, Oct. 14, 1972. In other words, as long as Japan is a state it naturally holds this 
right, but it refrains from using it as a constitutional pre-commitment. This basic position had long been 
maintained since 1972, but in July 2014, the current Cabinet with PM Abe changed the position and 
made it possible for Japan to use the limited right to collective self-defense. See Cabinet Decision on 
Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People 
(National Security Committee & Cabinet Decision, July 1, 2014) 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf.  For the Japanese version, see 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei.pdf.  
2  But the reason why the experts see this measure as unconstitutional varies. They actually are 
not monolithic in reasoning, but concurrent in conclusion. 
3  See, e.g., Linda Sieg & Teppei Kasai, SEALDs student group reinvigorates Japan’s anti-war 
movement, THE JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/29/national/ 
politics-diplomacy/sealds-student-group-reinvigorates-japans-anti-war-protest-movement/#.WB8toi2L
Rdg. 
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views on war and peace.  In other words, as some critics suggest, 
pacifist Japan has not been a “normal country” in regards to international 
standards.4  To wake people from this postwar “daydream,” PM Abe 
should have pushed for formal constitutional revision, thereby initiating a 
change in public awareness of security issues.5  I am claiming that PM 
Abe’s maneuver—simply changing the interpretation of the Constitution 
without changing the text of the law—has in part served to cloud public 
awareness of the magnitude of the constitutional transformation currently 
in progress.  This kind of subterfuge is not the higher politics that Japan 
needs at this crucial moment.  The risk of PM Abe’s strategy is that the 
deep-seated attitudes and ignorance about the harsh realities of war and 
security will not be changed at all so long as people stay in the postwar 
daydream of Pax Americana.  
Instead of such a self-righteous method as the interpretive change, 
Abe should base his ambitious project of constitutional change on a true 
deliberation subject to public oversight.  This would be the only way to 
realize the goal of transforming public awareness about the current 
international security situation.  PM Abe has opted instead for reckless 
bravery, while leaving his own people in the dark about the kind of 
fundamental changes he is trying to produce. 
The time-consuming, but deeply meaningful, process of formal 
constitutional change through public deliberation could have worked for 
PM Abe.  He could have actualized his original aim.  In his memoir, 
Toward a New Country, PM Abe explains what he means by the slogan 
for his 2012 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) campaign: “Take Back 
Japan.”  He stated that this slogan does not mean merely taking back 
Japan from the opposition DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan).  He 
concludes like this: “I dare to say it means taking back our country from 
its own postwar history and delivering it to the hands of the Japanese 
people.”6  His own personal political creed, “Break Away From the 
Postwar Regime,” is a much more striking expression of his actual 
position than is the LDP’s seemingly innocuous slogan.  In public 
                                                   
4  For an explanation of “normal country” in the Japanese context, see Lionel Pierre Fatton, Is 
Japan Finally A Normal Country?, THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 27, 2013), 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/is-japan-now-finally-a-normal-country/. 
5  I have argued this position before. See Keigo Komamura, Anpo Hoan to “Kyu Jo no Wa” 
[National Security Bills and “Circle of Article 9”], in YASUO HASEBE AND ATSUSHI SUGITA ED., ANPO 
HOSEI NO NANI GA MONDAI KA? [WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH NATIONAL SECURITY LAW?] 18, 27–29 
(Iwanami shoten, 2015). 
6  SHINZO ABE, ATARASHII KUNI E: UTSUKUSHII KUNI E (KANNZEN BAN) [TOWARD A NEW 
COUNTRY: TOWARD A BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY (COMPLETE EDITION)] 254 (2013). 
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debates, PM Abe emphasizes that he “would like to take significant steps 
to reconsider this country by drafting a new constitution from a tabula 
rasa with all the people.”7  It almost looks like he is proposing an 
“Abexit” (!)— departure from the status quo of postwar Japan to some 
more uncertain future. 
In short, PM Abe feels a strong urge to erase or delete the history of 
postwar Japan itself.  The target of his ambitions is the Constitution of 
Japan.  By erasing the current Constitution on the grounds that it was 
imposed by the U.S., he can simultaneously reshape the fundamental law 
of the land and extinguish the uncomfortable history of the postwar 
period.  Thereby, PM Abe thinks he will be able to recover Japan’s 
independence as a “normal country” and draw his own picture of a new 
Japan on a blank canvas.  
But what kind of picture would he like to draw?  Some critics 
claim it would be a picture designed to fit the ambitions that his own 
grandfather, former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, left unrealized.8  In 
the 1950’s and early 1960’s, PM Kishi intended to take back true 
independence from, or establish an equal relationship with, the U.S.9  I 
do not go so far as to say that this is merely family business even if a 
personal motive or an admiration for his own grandfather may possibly 
provide PM Abe with some motivation for his public cause.  The fact of 
the matter is that independence (from the Allied Occupation or other 
constraints) provides freedom to write any kind of constitution, and PM 
Abe is not necessarily intending to reproduce the type of constitution that 
might have suited his own grandfather, PM Kishi.  The truth is that we 
do not know exactly what kind of constitution we will end up with if PM 
Abe gets his way.  In fact, PM Abe has not explicitly stated which 
specific constitutional changes will bring about the desired goal of 
national independence, nor has he clarified how changing the 
Constitution can be expected to bring about such a result.   
We still have to ask PM Abe what picture he would like to draw on 
the blank canvas of his constitution.  In this short essay, I will examine 
what PM Abe and the LDP would bring about for Japan’s postwar 
                                                   
7  ABE SHINZO TAIRONSHU: NIHON WO KATARU [A COLLECTION OF THE DEBATES BY SHINZO ABE: 
SPEAK ON JAPAN] 78 (PHP ed., 2006). 
8  Johnathan Soble, Shinzo Abe’s Bid to Redifine Japan and Its Military Has Echoes of Family 
History, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/asia/japan-military-shinzo-abe-family-history.html?_r=0. 
9  As for PM Abe’s memories of his grandfather and his father, Shintaro Abe and his view on the 
lost mission of the LDP, see ABE, supra note 6, at 25–42; ABE, supra note 7, at 38–41. 
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constitutional project in place of the current Constitution of Japan.  To 
accomplish this goal, we should turn our concerns away from the issue of 
the national security laws (2015) and look closely into their own 
constitutional project, the LDP’s draft constitution (2012).  Actually the 
LDP’s draft constitution is not a proposal for partial revision.  Their aim 
is to replace the current Constitution with a totally new one.10  That 
means the draft will introduce a dramatically different vision of Japan, 
and, more importantly from a legal point of view, it will fundamentally 
change the role of constitutional law.  If the draft constitution were to be 
realized, then constitutional law in Japan would undergo an irreversible 
and dangerous transformation.  
The central problem with the LDP’s draft can be understood as 
follows.  In the LDP’s draft constitution, narrative formations are 
introduced and function to establish constitutional norms.  As I will 
argue in the following sections, the draft codifies 
narratives—myths—into the constitutional text. If the Constitution 
maintains its basic nature as a legal code, it should be based on universal 
principles, not contextual notions like narratives.   
 
II.  NARRATIVE, CONSTITUTION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
 
A. Constitution and Narrative 
 
Constitutions are enacted at moments of truth for a country.  
These can include revolutions, the achievement of independence, or 
defeat in war.  As the term constitution means a basic frame or structure 
of government and society, the ‘moment of truth’ from which a 
constitution is born is also a time to build or rebuild the nation or state.  
Generally, “nation-building” or “nation-rebuilding” are terms closely 
related to making constitution.  Usually, nation-building refers to the 
project of building a ‘nation-state.’  This means that would-be national 
founders have to carry out a double task: they must build a state and also 
define the terms of membership in that state.  In order to define its 
                                                   
10  For a comparative table of the current and the LDP’s draft constitutions, see Jiyumintô, Shin 
kenpô sôan [New Draft Constitution], Oct. 28, 2005, at 
www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051028_a.pdf [hereinafter LDP Draft].  
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territory and membership and to establish democratic government based 
upon national “borders,” the project of building the nation-state is always 
inclined to assert that the identity of its people is a matter of nationalistic 
bonds.  
As Jürgen Habermas once stated, constitutional states are not 
necessarily composed of purely legal concepts, and those legal concepts 
sometimes have “conceptual gaps” through which naturalistic concepts 
such as the people/nation may irrupt into the constitutional state.11  So, 
nation-building projects leave open the possibility for a naturalistic 
morality to be incorporated in the concept of a nation or a people.  In 
this context, national narratives widely shared among people are the most 
relevant force for unifying a people into one nation.  When a nation is 
about to be built, narratives come in to fill in the “conceptual gaps” that 
the constitution as a politico-legal document cannot cover.  
In their co-authored book, Making We the People, an amazing work 
of comparative study on the formation of the Constitutions of South 
Korea and Japan, Professor Chaihark Hahm and Professor Sung Ho Kim 
referred to the tension between the constitutions and their “unmasterable 
pasts.”12  They see the past as “the primary material out of which a new 
constitutional identity is forged,” and a new constitution sometimes 
stands in judgment of the past, while at other times it may exalt the past.13 
They state the claim like this: “More importantly, [a constitution] 
reinterprets the past and tries to incorporate it into a new narrative about 
the constitutional identity of the people” and “[I]n the process, the 
constitution may even invoke an imaginary past that never was.”14  In 
the process of making a new constitution, founders have to struggle with 
the past―accepting, rejecting, selecting, and editing the past.  So it is 
quite natural that attempts to master the unmasterable past bring about 
tension and highlight the inconsistencies regarding the legitimacy of a 
new regime.  To make up for such tension and inconsistency, nation 
builders (or constitutional architects) form national narratives based upon 
imaginary pasts and codify them into the text of the constitution. Hahm 
and Kim seem to see the tension between constitutions and their 
                                                   
11  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 115–16 (Ciaran 
Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998). 
12  See CHAIHARK HAHM & SUNG HO KIM, MAKING WE THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDING IN POSTWAR JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA 128–193 (Tom Ginsburg et al. eds., 
2015). 
13  Id. at 128. 
14  Id. 
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unmasterable pasts as positive.  They conclude as follows: 
 
Whether for or against, the people’s engagement with the 
past via constitutional founding and/or interpretation will be 
beneficial to the extent that it yields a narrative about their 
collective identity and common destiny.  As a pole of 
identity and contestation in the ongoing story of democratic 
peoplehood, presence of the unmastered and unmasterable 
past is essential to the making of a healthy and enduring 
constitutional democracy.15 
 
     I share their image of constitutional founding as a political project, 
however, as a legal scholar, I dare to point out some questions about this 
image: Should the unmasterable past remain unmasterable throughout the 
political life of a nation?  Does the unmasterable past need to remain 
open to interpretation and deliberation?  If so, what guarantees our 
ability to (re)interpret and debate about the past?  The narrative 
formation at issue here is both the most significant and the most 
contentious function of constitutional founding as a political project.  
But what happens to the founding of constitutional law as a legal project? 
 
B.  Constitutional Law and Legal Principle 
Needless to say, any constitutional founding is usually also the 
founding of constitutional law at the same time.  As I mentioned above, 
a national narrative provides legitimacy and “collective identity” for a 
political community.  It presupposes a substantially homogeneous 
society and sometimes, functions as a reason for the exclusion of people 
who do not accept or share it.  To the contrary, the law presupposes a 
value-pluralistic society where people with different views, creeds, or 
tastes live together somehow or other.  In such a difficult society, the law 
is granted special powers such as the normative power, or binding force 
to justify or regulate governmental actions and people’s activities, and to 
set up an order of justice.  
We can see that there is a contrast between the function of mythical 
narratives of identity and the functions of the law.  The theory of 
constitutional law and the rule-of-law tradition have long been premised 
upon the law’s independence from politics and its predominance over 
                                                   
15  Id. at 196. 
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politics. Given this arrangement, we can distinguish legal principles from 
national narratives and elevate the priority of the former over the latter.  
From this perspective, I will refer to a few problems of integrating the 
unmasterable past into an official narrative. 
First, the past is not a matter of facts alone.  No matter how the 
past, as a collection of facts, becomes integrated into narrative form, the 
narrative will never obtain normative force.  It is a sort of naturalistic 
fallacy to think that facts bring about norms.  When constitutional 
constituents select a narrative version of the past, what they are accepting 
or rejecting is not the past as a collection of facts.  They are actually 
opting to succeed to, or to reject, the principles upon which the past 
regime was based.  In fact, even Hahm and Kim, who make much of the 
connection between narrative and multiple pasts, use expressions like “an 
imaginary past,” or “the past as a source of legitimation in constitutional 
founding”, and argue that “neither the past to be effaced nor the past to be 
re-inscribed is an unmediated datum of fact.”16  Those expressions and 
arguments might suggest that they share the goal of distinguishing a 
narrative version of the past from some notion of the totality of all 
possibly relevant historical facts, and that they thereby acknowledge the 
role of a counterfactual imagination through which a past gets 
well-ordered. 17   What inspires such a counterfactual imagination?  
What makes the past well-ordered?  I suggest that the notion of legal 
principle provides a possible answer from the perspective of the law.18  
Second, as for the Constitution as a nation-building project, 
narratives shall sort out “the past to be re-inscribed” from “the past to be 
effaced” and incorporate it into an integral story of the nation. From the 
perspective of constitutional law as a legal project, it is a matter of legal 
principle that has to do the work of sorting them out.  As Hahm and Kim 
suggest, selective use of the past is a conspicuous attribute of narrative 
formations.  Narratives selectively (arbitrarily, actually) sketch the plot 
of a story to form a vision of the past, whereas the law (re)interprets the 
meaning of the past in light of legal principle.  This act of 
reinterpretation in light of legal principle is a strategy of law, which 
                                                   
16  Id. at 43–44, 128. 
17  Id. at 44 (quoting Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1049, 1064 (1995)). 
18  As for the arrangement of the current Constitution of Japan, it seems to take the notion of 
legal principle seriously. It refers to “a universal principle of mankind” in its preamble instead of 
national tradition or narrative (see Appendix 2). For the details of the current preamble, see infra Part 
III.A.  
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makes the unmasterable past masterable.  
Third, narrative is communal, but the notion of legal principle is 
grounded in the universalistic ideals of enlightenment reason.  Some 
scholars argue that narrative provides legitimacy for the law, or at least 
that judges should respect narratives as a form of nomos―a source of 
norm for each insular and autonomous community. 19   When this 
argument is extended from the law of insular and autonomous 
communities to the law of a nation, a narrative provides a legitimate 
foundation for constitutional law as well as for the law of communities.  
I agree with the idea that legal scholars should pay attention to, and 
respect, the norm-generating functions of particular communities, but I 
would like to be cautious of expanding this arrangement to constitutional 
law.20  
Although narrative sometimes gives strength to constitutional law, 
the latter should not be replaced with the former.  The reason for this 
limitation is that communal and inward-looking narratives cannot resolve 
conflicts of value.  By contrast, if legal principles are of a universalistic 
nature,21 then we can rely on legal principles to bring a right answer to 
even hard cases.22  Legal principles include individual rights, liberty, 
equal treatment under the law, separation of powers, and so on.  These 
legal principles are based on comprehensive doctrines that reasonable 
persons can accept as matters of rational choice. 23   Unlike 
narrative-based norms, these principles are incorporated as a mode of 
legal norm into the institution of a positive law.  
In the next section, I will refer to problems in the LDP draft 
constitution, including the proposal to revise important parts of the 
current constitution like the preamble, Article 13, and Article 97.  We 
will see that what they intend to do in this draft clearly demonstrates a 
typical case of serious tension between legal principles and national 
                                                   
19  Robert Cover argued that insular and autonomous communities like religious communities 
have norm-generating function as interpretive communities and that each of those communities has its 
own nomos―narratives, experiences, and visions to which the norm articulated―as basis of its own 
law or its own interpretation of what the law truly means. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
20  In other words, norms which autonomous community generates shall not be legal norms. 
21  As for what I mean by “universal,” I use this term in this essay not as “global” or 
“international” but as “being valid or valuable for every agent.”  So “a universal principle” is a 
comprehensive doctrine to be applicable, valid, and valuable beyond differences between states, groups, 
and individuals. 
22  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–28 (1977). 
23  JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 498 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
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narrative.24  
 
III. THE LDP DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND ITS PROBLEMS 
 
The LDP issued its most recent draft constitution in 2012.25  At 
that time, the Democratic Party (DPJ), the largest opposite party to the 
LDP, took the administration.  As the then-president of the LDP, Mr. 
Abe promised voters revision of the Constitution, carrying this new draft 
constitution as a flag in the general election in November 2012.  The 
LDP won the election, and took back the administration from DPJ.  On 
December 16, 2012, Mr. Abe became the Prime Minister of Japan once 
again.26  
In 2013, facing the House of Councillors election, the Upper House 
of the Diet of Japan, the LDP toned down its call to substantively revise 
the Constitution in order to gain more seats so that the LDP would then 
have the opportunity to revise the Constitution as it wished.  Actually, 
PM Abe led the LDP to a landslide victory, but they could not gain the 
super majority that would have made it possible for the LDP to propose a 
revised draft of the Constitution.  In 2015, as mentioned earlier, PM Abe 
won the victory in the debate on the National Security Law.  With this 
background, PM Abe revived the proposal to revise the Constitution and 
then focused on incorporating an emergency clause into the current 
Constitution.  In July 2016, the LDP won another victory in the election 
of the House of Councilors.  This time the LDP and its companion 
parties gained the super majority in both Houses, which may enable them 
to launch constitutional revision in the near future.27 
                                                   
24  I have briefly written about this issue. See Keigo Komamura, Kindai tono Ketsubetu, 
Monogarai heno Kaiki: Jiminto Kaikenan wa ikanaru imi de Rikkennshugi no kiki nanoka? [Break 
Away From Modernity, Return to Narrative: In What Sense the LDP Draft Constitution is Dangerous 
for Our Constitutionalism], in KAIKEN NO NANI GA MONDAI KA? [WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION?] 31–49 (Yasuhiro Okudaira et al. eds., 2013). 
25  Supra note 10.  
26  His first administration was September 26, 2006 to September 26, 2007. This administration 
lasted only one year because Mr. Abe suddenly resigned due to ulcerative colitis. See Alexander Martin, 
Japan’s New Leader Says Recover From Illness, THE WALL STREET Journal (Dec. 16, 2012), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324407504578182794060294914. 
27 The Constitution of Japan requires super majority to revise its text. Article 96 of the 
Constitution states “Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a 
concurring vote of two-thirds of all its members, and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for 
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon at such 
election as the Diet shall specify.” Gaining super majority in the Diet after the victory of the upper 
house election in 2016, PM Abe showed an explicit ambition to revise the constitution. See Reiji 
Yoshida & Tomohiro Osaki, Election Strengthens LDP as Opposition Flounders; Abe Says Talks to 
Begin on Constitutional Revision, THE JAPAN TIMES (Jul. 11, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 
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Now I would like to take a look at the LDP draft.  In order to 
clarify its problematic character, I will emphasize what it deletes from the 
current Constitution.  The provisions, which this draft removes, should 
be considered much more critical than the proposed new provisions 
because the deletions from the text erase the essentials of modern 
constitutionalism.  I argue that for PM Abe to accomplish his political 
project and to “Break Away From the Postwar Regime,” he proposes 
breaking away from the postwar Constitution also.  I will now refer to a 
few examples of these problematic deletions. 
 
A.  The Preamble 
1.  Potsdam Principles ―― The Constitution of Japan (1946) was 
established as an implementation of the Potsdam Declaration (1945) and 
based upon the principles which the Declaration required the Japanese 
Government to actualize.  In the website of its digital exhibition “Birth 
of the Constitution of Japan”, the National Diet Library states as follows:  
 
The Constitution of Japan was established through the 
confluence of efforts from both outside and inside Japan . . . 
The external forces to reform the Constitution of the Empire 
of Japan (Meiji Constitution of 1889) manifested themselves 
in measures taken under the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, which were necessary to 
implement the "Potsdam Declaration" as accepted by Japan 
upon its defeat.  The internal forces sprang from the 
people's desire to realize a true democracy, which would 
have been impossible by merely restoring the prewar 
parliamentary system after the cessation of hostilities 
because the military control of the government during the 
war had seriously corrupted the framework of the Meiji 
Constitution.28 
 
The Potsdam Declaration was agreed upon and issued on July 26, 
1945 by the U.S. President Harry S. Truman, the United Kingdom Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, and Chairman of the Nationalist Government 
                                                                                                                                                 
2016/07/11/national/politics-diplomacy/election-strengthens-ldp-as-opposition-flounders/#.WCFJu8lK
3YY.  
28  Preface: Birth of the Constitution of Japan, NAT’L DIET LIBR. 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/outline/00outline.html (last visited Sep. 29, 2016). 
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of China Chiang Kai-shek, as a call for the surrender of all Japanese 
armed forces.  The Emperor of Japan accepted the Declaration on 
August 14 and announced his acceptance the next day.  
While accepting the Declaration, the Japanese Government had 
been demanding that the Emperor be permitted to retain his authority and 
still remain at the center of the national polity (Kokutai).  This means 
they wanted to avoid any change to the Imperial Constitution.  However, 
Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers  
who had been granted strong powers to take any action necessary to 
successfully implement the Potsdam Declaration, issued the "Civil 
Liberties Directive" on October 4, 1945, and met with former Prime 
Minister Fumimaro Konoye to discuss reforming the Constitution.  On 
October 11, MacArthur met with Kijuro Shidehara, the newly appointed 
Prime Minster, and he proposed the “liberalization of the Constitution.”  
From MacArthur’s suggestions, the process of constitutional reform was 
launched.29  
 
2.  “A Universal Principle of Mankind” ―― Although the Japanese 
Government tried to resist a revision of the Meiji Constitution, the 
conditions the Potsdam Declaration (see Appendix 4) requested Japan to 
implement made it inevitable for them to bring about fundamental 
reforms to the Meiji Constitution because the conditions contained legal 
principles such as “a new order of peace, security and justice” (section 6), 
“the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies” (section 10), 
“[F]reedom of speech, of religion, and of thought” (section 10), “respect 
for the fundamental human rights” (section 10), “a peacefully inclined 
and responsible government” (section 12).  
Those principles became new guidelines for nation-building, which 
had never been introduced into, or had long disappeared from, Japan.  In 
the process of revising the Meiji Constitution, these “Potsdam principles” 
were consequently reflected in the preamble and other articles of a new 
constitution, the Constitution of Japan.30  Particularly, the preamble is a 
                                                   
29  See generally, RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY (2002). 
30  To some readers, this description here might be a bit confusing.  Actually, the process of 
making the current Constitution of Japan was not just complicated but also inconsistent.  The Potsdam 
Declaration requested the government of Japan to make fundamental reforms of its basic structure 
because its demand was totally different from the causes and principles on which the Meiji regime was 
based.  Therefore, this request would have led the government of Japan to establishment of a new 
constitution not revision of the Meiji Constitution.  However, in order to mitigate poplar shock of 
dramatic change of the regime, the government of Japan and SCAP took a strange measure by using 
Article 73 (revision clause) of the Meiji Constitution to realize constitutional change which the 
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depository of the Potsdam principles as a whole. In Appendix 1, you will 
find ideas or connotations similar to the Potsdam principles such as “duly 
elected representatives,” “sovereign power resides with the people,” “a 
sacred trust of the people,” “the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all 
nations,” and “the blessings of liberty.”  In sum, the Potsdam 
Declaration and the preamble of the current Constitution of Japan deeply 
share the great fruits of modern and contemporary thought like 
democracy, representative government, popular sovereignty, liberty, 
fundamental human rights, and pacifism. 
More importantly, we should focus our attention to the last two 
passages of the preamble (see Appendix 1) because it demonstrates that 
the current Constitution understands its arrangement of these principles as 
the statement of “a universal principle of mankind”—that is, not as a 
contextual tenet derived solely from Japanese culture or traditions.  
Furthermore, the last passage states “[W]e reject and revoke all 
constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith” 
(emphasis added).  In this part of the preamble, the current Constitution 
rejects not just laws, ordinances, and rescripts but also all prior and 
prospective constitutions in conflict herewith.  This means that all laws 
that conflict with the universal principles of mankind are rejected.  The 
current Constitution therefore denies any new constitutions that may 
come in the future if these are inconsistent with the essential values of 
universal humanism inscribed in the current Constitution. 
     The current Constitution itself tells about its procedural limitations 
on constitutional revision in Article 9631 and its substantial limitations in 
the preamble mentioned above. The LDP draft totally deletes these 
passages.  This means it will get rid of constitutional limitations on the 
process and substance of constitutional revision, and that it will thereby 
grant current and future political administrations limitless power to revise 
the Constitution.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Potsdam Declaration requested.  So, in its formality and procedure, the current Constitution of Japan 
is a revised version of the Meiji Constitution but, in its substance, it is a new constitution quite different 
from the former one.  To justify this inconsistency, Japanese constitutional law scholars have relied on 
“August Revolution Theory.”  For the details of the making process of the current constitution and 
“August Revolution Theory,” see Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, Nihonkoku Kenpo Seitei no Hori [Legal 
Theory of the Birth of Japan’s Constitution] in KENPO NO GENRI (1967); HAHM & KIM, supra note 12, 
at 145-147; SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 18-19 (2011). 
31  See supra note 28. 
88 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.  26 NO.  1 
 
3.  Narrative is Substituted ―― Turning our attention to the LDP 
draft preamble (see Appendix 1), it erases the current preamble in its 
entirety and replaces it with an alternative passage using wording like, 
“its long history and unique culture,” “along with treasuring conformity,” 
“formed this nation by families and communities helping each other,” 
“our beautiful land,” and “good tradition.” 
These are not rational principles, and there are no universal 
aspirations to be seen in these concepts.  These are terms that only 
become comprehensible to the extent that they provide a narrative 
reference to the history of Japan. 32   The subject of the first two 
paragraphs of the LDP draft preamble is “Our nation,” not “We, the 
Japanese people.”  This change in literary style set the first two 
paragraphs in the narrative-mode of telling the story of our nation. 
So the legal principles and universalistic norms are gone and 
instead the current LDP draft presents a narrative about Japan’s cultural 
uniqueness.  To be sure, many legal principles like popular sovereignty, 
fundamental rights, and pacifism still remain in the draft.  But this new 
arrangement places legal principles on the same status with a 
mythological narrative (I will discuss the details of this issue in section 
4).  
Furthermore, we lose words and phrases like “a universal principle 
of mankind,” and, “[W]e reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, 
ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.”  I must emphasize that if 
we lose these key provisions, the textual basis for limitations on 
constitutional revision will be lost, and thus the normative status of the 
Constitution of Japan may be diluted. 
 
4.  Emperor in the Preamble ―― One more thing I think deserves to 
be mentioned again is that the term “Emperor” is introduced into the LDP 
draft preamble (see Appendix 1).  The draft mentions the Emperor and 
the imperial institution in this phrase: “a country that has the Emperor, the 
                                                   
32  In fact, the LDP explains at page 5 in the Q&A of the draft why the current preamble needs to 
be replaced: “Since some of the articles of the Constitution of Japan are thought to have been provided 
based on the Western idea of natural human rights, we, the LDP, consider these articles necessary to be 
revised.” Also it says that “we propose our draft constitution in order to make the Constitution of Japan 
suitable for our country.  The stiff wordings due to translating GHQ draft constitution . . .  should be 
fully revised.”  You can see the Japanese version of the Q&A at the website of the Liberal Democratic 
Constitutional Reform Promotion Headquarters. See Nihonkoku Kenpo Kaisei Souan Q&A (Zouho 
Ban) [Draft for the Reform of the Constitution of Japan Q&A (Revised edition)], LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROMOTION HEADQUARTERS, (Oct. 2013), 
http://constitution.jimin.jp/faq/. 
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symbol of unity of the people, governed based on the separation of powers, 
legislation, government, and justice, under popular sovereignty.” 
(emphasis added).  Actually, the Emperor system is also presented in 
main body of the current Constitution in Article 1 and other places.  
However, there is no mention of the Emperor in the current preamble. 
    We should consider the textual arrangement of the LDP draft 
preamble that mentions the Emperor.  It has been noted that, “[T]he 
principle of popular sovereignty was stated in the text of the [current] 
Constitution simply as a subordinate clause in Article 1,” whose subject 
matter was the Emperor.33  Professor Hahm and Professor Kim, based 
upon this textual arrangement, said that, “the exact locus of sovereignty 
remains less than fully articulated in the text.”34  In fact, the textual 
arrangement is surely an important guide for legal interpretation.  
Instead of focusing on the interplay of the text within Article 1, I would 
refer to another dimension of the same issue.  There is no reference to 
the Emperor in the current preamble mentioned above.  
   It is a common understanding among Japanese constitutional law 
experts that the preamble does not have a direct binding power or 
function as a judicial norm in the way that the Articles in the main body 
of the Constitution do.  However, the preamble generally plays a role in 
guiding the interpretation of other Articles when there is some leeway in 
possible interpretations of the text of the Articles themselves.  Thus, the 
preamble has an interpretive function.  Therefore, we can understand 
how to interpret the meaning of the current Article 1—in which the 
Emperor system and popular sovereignty coexist in a state of 
tension—because the interpretive lens established by the the current 
preamble gives us a sense of how to read and resolve this tension.  As 
mentioned above, there is no reference to the Emperor in the current 
preamble, and the Potsdam Declaration makes no reference to the 
Emperor either.  However, both the current preamble and the Potsdam 
Declaration enumerate universal principles such as fundamental human 
rights, pacifism, and so on.  Given this arrangement, we have textual 
grounds to mediate the tension in the current Article 1 between the 
Emperor system and popular sovereignty by making use of the universal 
                                                   
33  John M. Maki, The Constitution of Japan: Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental 
Human Rights, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 78 (1990).  The full text of Article 1 of the Constitution 
of Japan is as follows: “Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the 
people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” 
34  HAHM & KIM, supra note 12, at 132.  
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principle of reason.35  This is how the text resolves the tension between 
the coexistence of popular sovereignty and the Emperor system: it has set 
the priority of the universal principles of reason in its preamble, so when 
tensions arise, they are to be resolved by the means of legal rationality.  I 
think that this arrangement in fact presupposes a theoretical or 
interpretive superiority of legal principles over the Emperor system. 
     On the other hand, the LDP draft preamble changes this textual 
arrangement and therefore also alters the implied interpretive strategy.  
In the LDP draft, the Emperor and narrative-based concepts are 
introduced in the proposed preamble, and then these concepts are given 
the same priority as legal principles.  This new arrangement means that 
the interpretive tension between the Emperor system and popular 
sovereignty will be deepened as the narrative concepts are moved up 
from Article 1 to the preamble itself.  If we think the preamble provides 
a frame to guide us in our interpretation of the Constitution, then we must 
admit that this proposed arrangement introduces a fundamental tension 
between law and narrative which disrupts the theoretical or interpretive 
superiority of legal principles over the Emperor system.36   
     To my interpretation and understanding, the preamble of the current 
Constitution, and the significance of the Potsdam principles as its 
ancestor, have just barely defended the foundation of our constitutional 
law over the years. It defends our Constitution from a populist urge to 
                                                   
35  Of course, the Emperor system is based upon the unique culture and history of Japan, and the 
Constitution itself recognizes the system in Article 1. But this uniqueness has to be interpreted and 
shaped to conform to the legal principles inherent in the interpretive guidance offered by the preamble 
and by other related Articles. It is always a difficult task for us to find the optimal balance between 
cultural uniqueness and universal reason. That is to say, the task of legal rationality is difficult, to be 
sure, but it is not impossible. 
36  I would like to discuss a bit more about this issue. As I mentioned in the main body of this 
essay, in the current Constitution, the Emperor system first appears in article 1 but is absent from the 
preamble. The preamble instead introduces the principle of legal rationality as the foundation of 
Japanese law. In this case, even the construction of the Emperor system must be in accordance with the 
principles of legal rationality. But how will this situation change if the Emperor system and the 
principle of legal rationality are both introduced in the preamble—both given the same level of 
priority? If the Emperor system and legal rationality are both introduced in the preamble, then the 
architecture of Japanese law will be made to stand on two foundations that will be in a fundamental 
tension with each other. 
    If that happens, then there are two possibilities.  First, in order to allow for the coexistence 
of both legal rationality and the Emperor system, then some form of optimal balance will have to be 
achieved (presumably through the nuancing of the Articles of the draft constitution).  The other option 
is problematic, but unfortunately, more likely.  The two foundations―legal rationality and the 
Emperor system―are granted equal legal status.  If that happens, the two foundations will be pulling 
in two different directions.  I am saying that in the LDP draft an irrational myth of national uniqueness 
takes on the same legal force as the universal principle of rationality.  If so, then there is a likelihood 
that the Emperor system will be granted the status of a legal exception, placed beyond the realm of 
legal rationality.  In other words, the myth of uniqueness will be rendered “sacred” as in placed off 
limits to rational interrogation and critique. 
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stake the foundation of our legal system not on universalist principles but 
rather on narrative or mythology.  The LDP draft preamble denies the 
independence of law from narrative and thus degenerates the most basic 
legal project of this country. 
 
B.  Article 13 
Article 13 (see Appendix 2) is another example of a problematic 
deletion proposed by the LDP in its draft constitution.  The current 
Article 13 states that, “[A]ll of the people shall be respected as 
individuals.”  In a sharp contrast with this, the LDP draft changes this to 
“[A]ll of the people shall be respected as persons.” 
     Replacing “individuals” with “persons” makes a difference.  
Needless to say, the concept of personhood includes not just individual 
persons but also so-called legal persons, such as corporations, groups 
with common ethnicity, or religious groups with common faiths.  In the 
modern tradition, we set up individual rights against not just state or 
government but also against churches, feudal organizations, or many 
types of craft guilds.  So this seemingly minor change in wording is 
another major departure from modern constitutionalism. 
 
C.  Article 97 
     Article 97 of the current Constitution will be entirely deleted by the 
LDP draft (see Appendix 3).  The LDP explains in the Q&A that the 
Article is a sort of redundancy because the draft uses several terms of 
rights in other places so that the draft still serves as a sufficient guarantee 
of fundamental human rights.37  I disagree.  I do not think it is a 
redundancy.  
This Article lies at the head of CHAPTER : SUPREME LAW 
and Article 98 follows.  The full textual arrangement is cited here:  
 
CHAPTER X.  SUPREME LAW 
 
Article 97. The fundamental human rights by this 
Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of 
the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived 
the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon 
this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time 
                                                   
37  See supra note 32, at 37. 
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inviolate. 
 
Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the 
nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act 
of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions 
hereof, shall have legal force or validity. 
(2) The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of 
nations shall be faithfully observed. 
 
     Clearly, Article 98 refers to formal force or validity of the highest 
legal norm.  It provides that the Constitution is the supreme law and the 
highest in the hierarchy of laws of the nation so that the Constitution 
holds the power to deny the legal force or validity of subordinate laws in 
conflict with it.  In Article 98, the Constitution refers to a function of the 
supreme law, that is, it states how the supreme law works. 
     In contrast, Article 97 explains the reason why the Constitution is 
supreme.  Significantly, it places a legal principle at the core of this 
reason.  That is, “fundamental human rights by this Constitution 
guaranteed,” and “fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free.”  So 
the idea of the supremacy of fundamental human rights finds its place 
here in Article 97, via the preamble, from the Potsdam Declaration. 
Undoubtedly, this Article is not a redundancy, but one of the most 
important clauses of the Constitution as it tells us the reason why our 
Constitution should be the supreme law and it traces a generating process 
of the current Constitution of Japan. 
 Article 97 and 98 articulate the substance and function of the 
supreme law.  These two taken together clarify the nature of our 
Constitution as a legal project.  If we lose Article 97 as proposed by the 
LDP draft, then we will also lose the universalistic and fundamental 
values used to justify the functions that the highest law should hold.  
The risk is that without such a foundation, the supreme law and its 
functions might be arbitrarily exercised based on the limited set of 
narrative-based norms that the LDP draft constitution attempts to 
introduce. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In July 10, 2016, the Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition 
partners won a two-thirds majority in the House of Councilors, the upper 
house of the Diet of Japan, to go along with their two-thirds majority in 
the House of Representatives, the lower house.  A two-thirds majority is 
required in each house to launch the process of revising the Constitution.  
PM Abe seemed to be refraining from placing the issue of constitutional 
reform on the agenda during the election.  However, now that PM Abe 
has won the game and gained a super majority in both Houses, 
constitutional revision might be reloaded as one of the central issues in 
the LDP’s platform.  
     In this short essay, I have been focusing on the LDP draft 
constitution because it is the only draft provided by the ruling parties so 
far.  As mentioned above, however, as far as the LDP draft constitution 
is concerned, it raises a host of thorny issues.  One of the most 
dangerous qualities of the draft is its clear tendency to dilute the 
autonomy of law from narrative.  This dilution reduces law to the realm 
of politics and inhibits the ability of the former to serve as a check against 
the latter.  A brief list of some of the fundamental problems with the 
LDP draft is daunting: the replacement of the current preamble, the 
erasure of “universal principle of mankind” from the text, the 
introduction of many narrative-based norms into our Constitution, the 
abandoning of our legal principles in favor of the elevation of a 
nationalist narrative, and so on.  
In closing, I ask: why does the LDP propose a shift to narrative 
now?  Considering the present state of tension in the Far East, I would 
emphasize that inward-looking measures are only heightening the 
tensions between the states in eastern Asia.  By contrast, a state based 
upon a universalistic foundation is qualified to open the channel to 
communicate with other states.  So as far as Japan maintains the 
supremacy of universalistic legal principles as the foundation of our 
Constitution, we will be able to critically engage with China, Korea, and 
even the United States.  In a sharp contrast with such a constitutional 
law strategy, however, the LDP draft constitution seems to make our 
country more inward-looking, reducing the import of our Constitution to 
the realm of nationalist myths based on narratives of cultural uniqueness.  
How does this, “every country has its own taste” measure work 
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for us?  The field of law and its interpretive strategies provide legal 
principles as a common ground.  These principles are a foundation that 
can be open to a particular modus vivendi while also requiring each state 
to make the effort to justify their own.  As for narrative, however, there 
is no other way to engage with it but to accept it or reject it.  There is no 
ground to stand upon for any negotiation.  
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Appendix 
 
―Comparison between the current Constitution (the Constitution of 
Japan (1946)) and the proposed constitution (the LDP draft constitution 
(2012)).38 
―Relevant sections of the Potsdam Declaration (1945). 
 
Appendix 1   THE PREAMBLE 
 
―The Preamble of the current Constitution of Japan (the first 
paragraph) 
We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives 
in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and 
our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the 
blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again 
shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of 
government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people 
and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of 
the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers 
of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the 
benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle 
of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and 
revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict 
herewith. (emphasis and underline added) 
 
―The Preamble of the LDP draft constitution 
Our nation, with its long history and unique culture, is a country that 
has the Emperor, the symbol of unity of the people, governed based on the 
separation of powers, legislation, government, and justice, under popular 
sovereignty.  
 Our nation has overcome and developed from the ruins of the Second 
World War and a number of catastrophes and now currently holds a 
prominent position in the global community, promoting friendlier 
relations and contributing to the peace and prosperity of the world 
                                                   
38  Supra note 10.  English translations of the Constitution of Japan and the LDP draft 
constitution were accessed at the following: The Constitution of Japan, NAT’L DIET LIBR., 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (Last modified 2003-2004); The Constitutional 
Amendment Draft, ASSOCIATION OF YOUNG LAWYERS TO PROTECT TOMORROW OF FREEDOM 
(November 1, 2013), http://www.asuno-jiyuu.com/2013/11/blog-post.html.  
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through pacifism.  
 We, the Japanese people, protect our own country and tradition with 
pride and spirit, respect fundamental human rights, along with 
treasuring conformity, and formed this nation by families and 
communities helping each other.  
 We, the people, respect freedom and discipline, protect our beautiful 
land and natural environment as we promote education and technology, 
and develop the country through economic activities. We, the Japanese 
people, in order to transmit good tradition and our nation to posterity for 
many years to come, herein, establish this constitution. (emphasis and 
underline added) 
 
Appendix 2   ARTICLE 13 
 
―Article 13 of the current Constitution of Japan (excerpted) 
All of the people shall be respected as individuals.  (emphasis and 
underline added). 
Article 13 of the LDP draft constitution (excerpted) 
All of the people shall be respected as persons.  (emphasis and underline 
added) 
 
Appendix 3   ARTICLE 97 
 
―Article 97 of the current Constitution of Japan  
The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the 
people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of mankind to be free; 
they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are 
conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time 
inviolate. 
 
―Article 97 of the LDP draft constitution 
 - Deleted – 
 
Appendix 4  THE POTSDAM DECLARATION 
(PROCLAMATION DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE 
SURRENDER) (issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945)39 (relevant sections 
                                                   
39  2 THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NIHON GAIKO NENPYO NARABINI SHUYO BUNSHO: 
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only) (emphasis and underline added). 
 
6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of 
those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking 
on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and 
justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the 
world. 
 
10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or 
destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war 
criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. 
The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and 
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. 
Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for 
the fundamental human rights shall be established. 
 
12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as 
soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been 
established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese 
people a peacefully inclined and responsible government. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
1840–1945 (1966). 
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